Is there an exception to free speech if its purpose is to exclude from the conversation certain views or groups? Ulrich Baer and Ted Gup have written dueling commentaries on this question. Baer argues that campuses are right to deny a forum to speakers whose racist or misogynist message defines other voices as unworthy of participation in the debate. Gup answers that once the principle of free speech is abridged for any reason, the inevitable result is more power for those who have already have it, more danger for those who do not. The protection Baer believes he is extending to the marginalized and underprivileged will turn out to be the road to their further victimization. Gupta sees Baer as mistaken that an exception carved out for the most just or compassionate of reasons can be kept under control and not abused for baser purposes.

There is a strong echo of this argument in the conflicts over campaign finance regulation. Those who would like to see the imposition of tighter limits on campaign spending are often making a Baer-like argument, with a twist. They do not peg their point to the content of the paid message: It could be on any subject. But they believe that the capacity to spend heavily to promote one’s views is an act of domination over those who don’t have the resources to answer. The wealthy are establishing an exclusive forum for speech funded at that level: Only a few can participate. This is an affront to democratic self-governance. It is, to borrow Baer’s words, threatening to “equal access to pubic speech,” and limits serve to “ensure the conditions” of such speech.

So, seen through this perspective much like Baer’s, limits are justified. And, just as Baer argues, staunch campaign finance advocates have long maintained that speakers restricted in the use of one outlet for their views can always can turn to others. Those whose speech confronts limits are still free to hold their beliefs and express them, just not at liberty to spread them on whatever terms and in whatever ways they choose.

The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo famously rejected the notion that the speech of some may be limited in order to lift up the speech of others. Gup goes farther, insisting that, even if speech limits are intended to have this leveling effect, they usually don’t. The historical record to which Gup appeals tends to show that well-intended speech restrictions end up working against the interests of the marginalized and underprivileged. Once limits on access to a forum may be set, choices of who may spend, and how much, must be made. Gup writes that“ the advocacy of a dynamic line between protected and unprotected speech grants a license to those in power to smother dissent of all sorts….”

So, for progressives, the question presents itself– to whom are they prepared to cede that power to set speech limits? This question cannot be separated from the question of the wisdom of limits themselves. Limits are not all the same, and their design and administration, including any exceptions that are provided for, make all the difference. Someone has to decide. Gup’s point is: Beware.

We don’t have to look far back for examples to support this mistrust, or wait too long for troubling possibilities. The President we now have was critical of Citizens United–but apparently because of his dissatisfaction with the spending it opened up for his primary opponents. He feels differently about–and opposes–limits imposed by the tax code on the political activity of religious institutions. He may be given to a characteristically raw expression of these views and of his self-interest, but he is not the first among those in power to like some some restrictions and dislike others as the spirit–and political objectives–move him. He is also keeping alive his threat to support changes in the libel laws so that he can more freely use them to attack a critical press.

That’s always the problem with limits on speech: the problem of who’s in charge.