A federal judge once opined that the federal campaign finance laws were hard to follow, and the same perplexity has been expressed by the Supreme Court—directly, in the course of oral argument, and somewhat less directly in an opinion of the court.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 334-35 (2010) (Kennedy, J.).  Conflicts over the constitutionality of various enactments and rules are common.  And much has been written about the  use and misuse of the heavily regulated legal process to harass, wear down or disgrace political adversaries.

Notwithstanding all of that, the beleaguered participant in the political process looking for legal advice can run into trouble when shopping for free or discounted legal services. Under federal and numerous state laws, these services are a contribution, like any other “in-kind” contribution, with some exceptions.  A fully  individual volunteer effort is typically permissible.  Or a firm can donate but not bill for the time of its lawyers,  provided the services are solely for the purpose of assuring compliance with the law  and the value of the services is disclosed.  As soon as life becomes more complicated, getting the help of a lawyer runs into contribution limits or restrictions on the sources of funds.

The Center for Responsive Politics and the Sunlight Foundation have teamed up to preview the consequences if the Supreme Court in McCutcheon eliminates the biennial aggregate limit. Their work is the latest of a number of analyses predicting trouble without the limit.  It is also the most recent of its kind to exhibit the flaws in these predictions—and to suggest that the real concern with McCutcheon may lie elsewhere.

Public Citizen attempts to make the case that the Supreme Court's pending decision in McCutcheon could, if wrongly decided, unleash a flood of money with the probable effect of corrupting the political process. The argument is the one heard before in briefs and in oral argument about joint fundraising committees. A donor who gives to a joint fundraising committee can write a check for millions, to be apportioned within the limits among all the joint fundraising participants. Public Citizen warns against "naïveté": the more “practical” view it urges is that the officeholder who solicits for the joint fundraising committee risks corruptive indebtedness to the donor.

The McCutcheon case continues to stir up comment about the hypotheticals the Justices used at oral argument to debate the need for an aggregate limit. Zac Morgan at the Center for Competitive Politics takes on one such hypothetical and suggests that it does not illustrate the need for any such limit. He correctly contends that the anti-earmarking and anti-proliferation provisions of the statute would apply with or without an aggregate limit to prevent the violation the hypothetical was meant to suggest.

The Supreme Court has boxed the debate over campaign finance into a corner, forcing the focus entirely on "corruption." Because corruption is the whole game, it is played with vigor, and we have seen in recent years how the term has been pulled this way or that, depending on the commenter’s policy preference.