In policy and legal academic circles, political parties have come back into vogue. If a New Year's “in” list was constructed, the parties would have a fair chance of being included. In discussions of polarization, in particular, parties are increasingly thought to have something to offer to a solution or an improvement: stronger parties, better funded, would offer their leadership more control over their membership, and with that control might come the capacity to induce bi-partisan compromise and achieve better governance. 

To Michael Malbin’s credit, he is taking seriously the political parties’ complaint about the terms under which they must compete for resources and influence with “outside” or independent groups. He accepts that a “rebalancing” is in order, and he proposes a compromise: more room for parties to coordinate their spending with candidates, in return for tighter enforcement of coordination rules against independent expenditure groups. He calls this a “third approach” to reform that which rejects both full de-regulation of party spending and any frontal challenge to the constitutional protections for independent spending.

If the uses of campaign finance rules to battle undue influence or its appearance will remain perpetually bogged down in disagreement – – particularly over whether the benefits of regulation justify the cost – – it does not follow that money in politics as a question for public policy has run its course. The question may have been overemphasized as one of corruption of the governmental process: corruption of the electoral process is also increasingly a concern, if less clearly and distinctly articulated. Critics of the condition of campaigns cite a range of problems with them, most recently and with rising alarm the candidates’ and parties’ loss of control to “outside groups” —Super PACs and (c) organizations—that operate under a different set of rules.

An astute piece by Mark Schmitt refocuses the argument on that point—the role of money in distorting the operation of the electoral process. He singles out for attention how a select community of donors influence the selection of candidates and the presentation of issues, raising questions of accountability and of the quality of voter engagement. This perspective has major implications for reform programs.

This is the position I submitted to the New York Times’ “Room for Debate” Forum, on the question of the state of campaign finance regulation and possible directions for its future:

 

Forty years after the passage of the federal campaign finance laws, we have considerable experience with how they work, but the debate about them has become tired and repetitive. No one is happy with the situation as it now stands: not those who worry about corruption, not those troubled by the First Amendment cost of extensive regulation, and not those who yearn to bolster public confidence in the integrity of their government. There is everywhere evidence that reconsideration and rebuilding are in order.

The Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 have filed and published with a press release comments on a matter, scheduled tomorrow for FEC consideration, involving political party financing of national conventions.  These organizations have strong views on the alternatives before the Commission, as would be expected. But their choice of arguments says much about contemporary campaign finance debates.  (Note: I am counsel to one of the parties that filed the request for an Advisory Opinion).