The views of the Perry prosecution have sorted out quickly into a majority sharply questioning its merit, and a minority insisting that judgment be reserved until the facts are known.  The prosecutor has not been heard from, other than via a two-page indictment short on detail and his avowal that the case involved a non-partisan application of the law to the facts.

The McCutcheon decision intensified the disagreement about when the use of money in politics is corrupt, and when it is just politics.  Chief Justice Roberts endorsed in general terms one bond that money creates—official “responsiveness” to constituents, whom he apparently took to include donors.  The Chief Justice ruled out legislative attacks on the “ingratiation” and “access” that contributions might buy.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1441, 1462 (2014).  Critics were appalled.  Yet, for all the excitement that followed, neither the few lines the Roberts opinion almost summarily devoted to the question nor much of the response to him helped clarify the critical issue: what is tolerable politics and what crosses the line?

In the coming campaigns, in 2014 and beyond, political reform is certain to be a topic for discussion. The press will look for a clear statement of the candidate’s positions; the Supreme Court will decide at least one more case that will excite comment and lead to proposals; and certain other prominent issues, such as income inequality and government performance, lead naturally to arguments about campaign finance and lobbying reform. We can imagine, too, that the candidates in addressing these issues will sort out as they most always do—Democrats supporting reform that Republicans find objectionable, with the divide displayed sharply in competing depictions of the soundness and effects of Citizens United.

The McCutcheon case continues to stir up comment about the hypotheticals the Justices used at oral argument to debate the need for an aggregate limit. Zac Morgan at the Center for Competitive Politics takes on one such hypothetical and suggests that it does not illustrate the need for any such limit. He correctly contends that the anti-earmarking and anti-proliferation provisions of the statute would apply with or without an aggregate limit to prevent the violation the hypothetical was meant to suggest.

One of the consolations of the contribution is its regulatory clarity; the permissible sources, the limits on amount, and the reporting requirements are all well established. And yet even contributions made in good order can cause trouble for the contributor—not with the Federal Election Commission, but in defending public corruption charges in the criminal justice system.