The recent emails from the Federal Election Commission, unearthed through a Freedom of Information Act request, don't reveal much that is new about the agency or the election law bar.  That Republican or Democratic lawyers might speak an encouraging word to the Commissioners on their side of the aisle does not qualify as breaking news. Here and there is a congratulatory note, or a substantive but not case-specific comment: but that's about it. Should anyone be surprised, it would be the long-time skeptic who has imagined that the parties are weighing in on pending decisions in the dead of night. There is none of that in these disclosures.

What to do about super PACs? Joel Gora, no admirer of campaign finance restrictions, argues that we should defend them. Joel Gora, Free Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They Co-Exist? Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 346 (2013). If they have come to typify the problems with money in politics, Gora contends, it is because we fail to appreciate their contribution to free speech, or their origins in long-standing independent expenditure jurisprudence. He adds: they didn't have the impact on the outcome that their critics widely feared. In other words, super PACs are good things, not bad things.

Don McGahn has made his mark on the Federal Election Commission, and the recent Boston Globe account tells the story in familiar terms: he was dedicated to the evisceration of the campaign finance laws, he could count on the support of his Republican colleagues, and he did not go about this business with a soft touch. Commissioners now decline to reach across the aisle except to swat at one other, leaving two senior members to argue over the question of which of the them refused to answer the other's phone calls. The agency’s operations are defined by dysfunction, its atmosphere by disharmony. As the Globe dates these developments, the year 2008, when McGahn came to the FEC, is the turning point.

To accept that this is an unattractive portrait of the FEC—that this is not a model of constructive regulatory exertion even on difficult issues—is not to say that the picture is complete. The FEC has found the going rough for years, as the Globe noted: "stalled from the start," in the words of an early Common Cause critique. If what was once a stall has developed into flaming breakdown, the explanation must rest on more than the obduracy since 2008 of Don McGahn and his colleagues. The Globe makes a light pass on other factors but they remain in the background, diminished and incomplete.

As the combatants see it, each side in its own way, the stand-off within the Federal Election Commission is a conflict over principle and the proper reading of the law. Commissioners affiliated with the Democratic Party say they seek reasonable but vigorous enforcement; the Republican-affiliated Commissioners say they apply only the law as it is, within constitutional limits, and not as the Democrats wish it to be. The disagreements run through a host of regulatory decisions; they affect the writing of advisory opinions, the outcome of enforcement decisions, and the decisions over whether to appeal adverse court judgments. Bad feeling seems to run high. But, as one might expect, no Commissioner would concede in the slightest that partisanship or power politics accounts for the way their positions are formulated or their votes are cast. And it is always difficult when there are differences over matters of substance to be certain of the play of politics beneath the surface. It might be suspected; it is often hard to prove.

Richard Briffault is unfailingly astute in his observations about the campaign finance laws and lucid in expressing them. In the days not too long ago when worries gathered around “527”s, he wrote an insightful essay on that subject. Now, with Super PACs on the minds of campaign finance analysts, he has turned attention to them. His subject is the Super PAC dedicated to the election of a single candidate and run, often with the candidate’s public approval, by former staff and associates. He proposes that the “coordination” standard be re-defined to capture these cases of “disguised contributions” and bring them within limits. These are not independent committees, he argues, but candidate committees in all but the name.