FEC Chair Ravel is not the first former or present Commissioner to turn to Comedy Central to lampoon her own agency.  Trevor Potter, once also a Chair, came to run a major reform organization that collaborated on bits of high comedy with Stephen Colbert. He even would emerge for his performance in a shower of dollars from something called the Mazda Scandal Booth. But he was out of the agency then and Ms. Ravel is still running it, and she decided that she had had enough of the FEC’s dysfunction and would play it for laughs. One of her colleagues was not amused.

Chair Ravel defended her appearance as free speech and as the only way now, all else having failed, to make her point. The problem for the FEC in any resort to high comedy is that the audience may misunderstand the joke. It is not a far cry from laughing at the agency to laughing at the law and concluding that politicians will never make or enforce rules against their own interest. The same ridicule can and has been directed at reform proposals.

The quips at the FEC’s expense depend on clever bits of exaggeration and oversimplification that, in the best humor, expose some measure of truth. The tricky part is keeping the exaggeration under control so that it does not overwhelm the routine and strike a false note. Does the audience come away both entertained and better informed, or at risk of being misled?

Sometimes those who disagree about campaign finance are almost deliberately talking past each other, dreading any concessions because, they think, to give an inch is to surrender a mile.  This seems increasingly the case in arguments about disclosure and a good example are the opposing reactions to the Supreme Court's recent decision to decline review of California's 501(c)(3) disclosure requirements upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2015).

Here is one fundamental difference: the belief on the part of decision proponents that it was a victory for campaign finance disclosure, and reply by critics that it had nothing to do with campaign finance at all.  And indeed, in technical terms, the case is not a campaign finance case – – it does not involve electoral activities, which 501(c)(3)'s may not conduct, and the information that the government is asking for is not in theory to be made available to the general public but only for the use of authorities for law enforcement.

To those who favor the State of California’s position, however, its significance goes well beyond its holding viewed in the most narrow terms.  If the case did not concern campaign finance, they seem to be saying, it was close enough: it involved a privately funded nonprofit advocacy organization, and a court willing to invalidate those disclosure rules might be tempted to export this critical attitude to the sphere of campaign finance.  There is a fear at work here that if a crack opens in disclosure requirements anywhere, they could expand to swallow up the campaign finance rules. On this theory, the court should be favorable to disclosure of political activity all kinds, to avoid damage down the line to rules of one particular kind.

The discussion of the parameters of compelled disclosure has become, in this sense, politicized.  Anxieties about the collapse of the campaign finance laws are gathering around all roughly similar disclosure requirements as a sort of last stand.  Rick Hasen has written that "campaign finance disclosure laws are under attack" and that much of the criticism has been "offered disingenuously with the intention to create a fully deregulated campaign finance system." Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L.& Pol. 557, 559 (2012).  In his view, because the questioning of disclosure requirements is in many cases "pretextual”, id. at 559, this Court must be closely watched, because if it appears to move away from transparency in any case involving public advocacy, the end could be near. The Court could be poised to water down the disclosure commitment expressed in Citizens United.

Meanwhile, the important doctrinal question of how to measure the costs as well as the benefits of compelled disclosure is passing out of focus.  There is general acceptance that harassment is a cognizable injury threatened by disclosure of a nonprofit association's members and donors, and that in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S, 1 (1976) and Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982), the Supreme Court provided a remedy through exemptions that can be granted in particular cases to endangered speakers.  But on the question of how this exemption should be structured or operate, the differences are wide.

Visiting Harvard Law School, Justice Kennedy answered a question about Citizens United by saying "what happens with money in politics is not good."  And he tied certain of these unfortunate effects to that case: the "result is not happy."  Frank Wilkinson of Bloomberg News wondered if the Justice was having “second thoughts” about his campaign finance jurisprudence.

The Justice did not say clearly what about the use of money in politics is not good, or in what particular respects the results of Citizens United are not happy.  Part of the problem, he said, was disclosure, which is too slow.  With faster, Internet-speed reporting, voters could decide whether a candidate receiving certain sources and amounts of money deserve their vote.  This is as far as he would explicitly go, but there were hints of other reservations that he would still have about undoing Citizens United.

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Larry Lessig’s campaign ran into a series of problems, the last and decisive one being his failure to qualify for inclusion in the debates. Earlier he had founded a Super PAC to establish that a well-funded campaign finance advocacy could swing an election. It did not work out as planned.  He also tried out unsuccessfully a referendum candidacy that featured a pledge that he would not serve a full term, only as long as necessary to effect his reform program, after which he would turn the reins over to his vice president.  He found that voters did not respond well to that message.

In each instance, much to his credit, Lessig explained openly the reversals he had suffered.  In the case of the debates, he blames the party debate inclusion criteria, but in the others, he confessed error or miscalculation.  He never doubted the cause, but has acknowledged the problems with his campaign.

Perhaps, however, the cause he champions, while an important part of a campaign, is not sufficient to carry it. The platform on which Lessig was running – – that campaign finance must be fixed "first", before anything else can be done – – may simply lack persuasive force. The fatal flaw revealed by each of his successive disappointments seems to have been just this single-mindedness. The super PAC was supposed to show that this issue alone was a winning issue; the referendum presidency he offered was to be so exclusively concerned with campaign finance, that the referendum president would resign his post as soon as he met with success on only that one policy initiative.

Tom Edsall’s piece on Congressional public financing proposals imparts a good sense of both their appeal and their vulnerabilities—the reasons why they have strong supporters and equally committed detractors.  Of all the points of disagreement, perhaps the simplest is the use of public money: either you believe that political reform, like any other, requires funding, or you will protest that the use of taxpayer dollars is nothing more than “welfare for politicians.”  Should the argument move from there, the competing claims about costs and benefits are notoriously hard to test, and what passes for an acceptable case depends on profound differences in political perspective.

These are the principal claims:

--less corruption: that dependence on private funding can lead to quid pro quo corruption;

--better public policy: that candidates who spent too much time fundraising develop a skewed view of public and policy    priorities--and there can be a related objective, highlighted by Edsall, that public financing schemes will result in better progressive policy, such as a higher minimum wage, stronger gun controls and the abolition of the death penalty;

--better electoral process: that ordinary citizens without wealth or high-level connections would have more of a chance to run      for office, offering more choice in candidate backgrounds, worldviews and platforms;

--better government: that candidates would spend less time on fundraising and more at their jobs;

--more political equality: that the political system would benefit overall from a more “level playing field.”