The flooding of the IRS with criticisms of the proposed rulemaking has shown that, on this issue at least, Washington is experiencing unity across party and ideological lines. The basic complaint, of course, is that the draft rule is too broad, chilling or preventing or just burdening legitimate political speech or activity.  It is a remarkable proceeding.  Activities that have been the targets of soft money reform for years—issue advertising and various other voter education activities—are now being vigorously defended against government regulation. In  the short run, the result may be a rulemaking indefinitely delayed or, in content, much changed.

But, apart from the question of whether or how this draft might be revised to address these critiques, the hostile reception to the proposals may influence the course of the campaign finance debate in other ways.   Here are two:

Under the federal campaign finance laws, the FEC and the IRS are directed to “consult and work together” in making their rules “mutually consistent.” 2 U.S.C. § 438(f). The IRS now proposes new 501(c)(4) tax exempt advocacy rules, responding to campaign finance controversies associated with the old ones, and the time has come for it to “consult and work together” with the FEC.  But the FEC Commissioners don’t themselves “work together” very well on these issues and so, splitting along party lines, they have presented two views to the Service. The difference in viewpoint is predictable—Democrats favor disclosure, Republicans are suspicious of it—but the real interest of these submissions lies more in the strategies behind these presentations than in their substance.

Here, then, are summaries of each set of comments, following by a “translation” into more straightforward terms of what rival camps are really trying to say and do.

In a Washington Post piece, Rick Hasen argues that if the aggregate individual contribution limits fall in the McCutcheon case, the results could be both good and bad.  To the good: parties could raise and spend more freely, and therefore would be strengthened when more vigorous parties are needed to temper polarization and alleviate governing gridlock.  To the bad: “more” corruption would result from expanded large donor influence over the political process.  Rick wishes that the two goals, clean but also functional politics, could be achieved in tandem, but with the Supreme Court’s  limitation on Congress’s authority to prevent corruption, he is convinced that we might have to accept more corruption in return for possibly better government.

In the discussion of Super PACs,  seemingly different concerns tend to intermingle or become fused together, creating confusion.  Most obvious is the continuing disagreement about whether candidate support for an independent committee, particularly fundraising, results in “coordination.”  Some argue—some propose an amendment to the law to provide—that a candidate’s public endorsement of a committee, including but not limited to appeals for funds, is coordination.  Another view distinguishes among Super PACs and would subject single-candidate committees to stricter coordination than others.

Are parties now weaker, or holding their own if we just see them in the right way?  The question has engrossed political scientists, but more general interest is growing in direct proportion to the worry that healthy parties could play a constructive role in tempering polarized politics.  Rick Pildes argues for the view that parties are struggling through a period of political fragmentation, defined as a “diffusion of political power” away from the political parties and their leadership, and he see them as in need of help if they are to contribute to the management of polarization.  Seth Masket answers that parties still exert their power effectively, if in a new form, through a complex “network” composed of “candidates, officeholders, activists, major donors, media figures and others.”