When Senator McConnell recently and aggressively needled Norm Ornstein at an AEI event, the coverage first settled on the jibe, and then, a little later, on the Senator’s denial that his position skeptical of campaign finance disclosure had changed for 25 years. All interesting or entertaining enough, but the Senator said more about his objections to campaign finance regulation—all government involvement in campaign finance, including disclosure and public financing—and it is well worth close attention.

Barely had the Court issued its opinion in the Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, invalidating Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and for all practical purposes Section 5, when the State of Texas promptly announced a new photo ID requirement. And the Court’s reasoning in this and other cases in recent years, including the freshly minted Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 570 U.S. ____(2013), leaves little doubt that it is emboldening states to proceed on the path of the last few years, imposing ID and other limitations on access to the polls.

Campaign finance jurisprudence is intensely concerned with free speech rights, less and decreasingly with associational rights, and not at all with a more comprehensive conception of the requirements for conducting political action—“doing politics.” Why this is so is worth exploring. Something is missing here, and the gap is consequential.

So this is the question being debated about the Court opinion in the Arizona voting law pre-emption case: is it a major victory for the federal government, or just a win in this case, with the longer term effects to lie more on the side of the states’ authority to shape voting rights in federal elections? Forecasts range from sunny (The New York Times) to cloudy (Hasen) to stormy (Lederman).

Here is another reply by Greg Colvin, answering the second post here on the topic. Colvin picks up on the last word of the June 5 posting—“intent”—and argues that it is well settled that the IRS does not look into intent when judging political activity. He also defends the liberalizing effect that the proposed rules would have on certain voter education activity.

Greg, it seems, may be overstating his assurances that “intent” is not, as a matter of law, a permissible factor in the test of whether a 501(c)(4) organization is engaged in “political intervention.” This is an important issue for those disinclined to have the federal tax law enforcement agency ferreting out the possible political intent of issue advocacy communications.