A few questions and comments have passed back and forth on the election law listserv about a procedural question raised by the Ravel-Weintraub petition to the FEC for a rulemaking: would the two Commissioners apparently filing this petition in a private capacity have to recuse themselves from voting on it? But there is also a question, not so far discussed, of other consequences that could attach to their decision to raise certain issues in this form. Potential recusal is part, not all, of the problematic course that this initiative could take.
The Commissioners wish to have the Commission "clarify" two issues they claim to have been thrown into some doubt by Citizens United. They are concerned that there is some uncertainty about “whether and to what extent” foreign nationals and foreign owned or controlled US subsidiaries can be involved in making corporate independent expenditures. A second clarification is intended to leave no doubt that employers, now prohibited from coercing their employees into making PAC contributions or facilitating candidate fundraising, may also not direct or pressure them into supporting independent expenditures.
If there was doubt about the law on either issue, the Commissioners have now sanctioned and indeed deepened it.
“Desperate” at the FEC
By petitioning their own agency for a rulemaking, Commissioners Weintraub and Ravel have found a novel way to charge their colleagues with fecklessness. Call it a populist gesture: they are stepping out of their roles as administrators and issuing their appeal from the outside, as members of the general public. They may have done all they could or intended to do with this Petition, which was to publicize their grievances. Or they may have sought to add to public understanding of the grounds of this grievance-to enlighten and inform, and not only turn up the volume of their complaint.
A first point—minor but worth considering-- is whether this agency needs another quirky procedural controversy. What does it mean for two Commissioners, one of whom is agency Chair, to dispense with their formal roles and petition as citizens, filing a petition on plain paper without their titles and just the Commission’s street address? Will they recuse themselves from voting on the petition as Commissioners? Will they testify before themselves?
One explanation provided to USA Today is that it will allow for a hearing at which the general public will be heard. But such a hearing has been held, and the Chair could have unilaterally arranged for another, as she did recently in convening a forum on the role of women in politics.
The answer to this may be no more than: it does not matter, because the Petition serves only to make a point. A sympathetic observer would call it a cri de coeur; one less sympathetic might see it as a PR maneuver. What might unite the two sides is merely their agreement, for entirely different reasons, that the Commission is not in good working order. The risk of the petition initiative is that rather than move the discussion to a better place (hard as that is), it sends a dreary message about the state of the agency.
Super PACs: Causes and Effects
Professor Bradley Smith has written an exceptionally succinct and well-argued case for super PACs. This author of Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform does not neglect to cite “personal freedom” in defense of these organizations, but he challenges their critics on one other level: their effects on the electoral process. He argues that super PAC spending improves turnout and competition, lessens the fundraising burden on candidates, and addresses other issues in the political system, such as the early primary states’ grip on the nominating process. Whatever else one may think about all this money, he writes, we should see Super PACs as beneficial – – doing good things for the political process.
There are points of major interest in Smith’s presentation, which are found in both what he says and what he does not.
Public Citizen has concluded that the Federal Election Commission is failing. Its shortcomings are "dramatic and uncharacteristic", because they range across the entire field of their responsibilities in conducting audits; enforcing the law through investigations, settlements and lawsuits; and issuing regulations and advisory opinions. The Public Citizen analysis is statistical and focuses on vote deadlocks. The FEC is indeed disagreeing a great deal—about that, there is no doubt. But is the agency failing or is the old regulatory model collapsing under the pressure of changing law and political practice?
Public Citizen cannot answer this question because it is looking at agency performance in the aggregate. It is unable, for example, to explain what might be happening in particular cases, or why deadlocks are occurring across various agency functions. There are certainly instances where the vote for enforcement is as suspect as a vote against it. The result is still deadlock but the reasons for it are not quite what Public Citizen implies. Nonetheless, it being assumed that matters could not have gotten this bad without dereliction of duty somewhere, the FEC takes the blame. It is expected to take up the big issues, such as those involving "coordination" or "dark money", which are precisely the issues over which disagreement is certain to arise. And so around and around it goes.
One alternative available to the FEC in this period of uncertainty is to commit itself to less controversial but highly productive functions. Bipartisan suggestions have been made, for example, that it could do better in discharging its disclosure function, and in reforming, as Congress has directed, the operation of its Administrative Fines program. There is value in starting with these basic responsibilities. To the Commission’s credit, it has initiated a rulemaking to move in this direction.
And on this question of disclosure, there is much to be done, more than suspected by many who hold the view that, for all the discord and disappointment, campaign finance law administration has performed well on public reporting. Now we have some fresh scholarship by Jennifer Heerwig and Katherine Shaw that subjects this assumption to careful, critical examination. Jennifer A. Heerwig and Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass Darkly: The Rhetoric and Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, Geo. L. J. 1443 (2014).
The State of the Debate
The Supreme Court has been asked to consider whether the Attorney General of California may require tax-exempt organizations to produce donor information normally provided only to the Internal Revenue Service. The petitioner, the Center for Competitive Politics, argues that the Ninth Circuit has improperly upheld this requirement by giving the State ready access to this information on a slim-to-none showing of need. The Attorney General has asserted that the information will be useful to the State's attempts to enforce the law, such as the protections against self-dealing or improper loans. Others apparently suspect that there is more going on, namely, a move to discourage the sort of politically shaped tax-exempt activities associated with the Koch brothers.
This is an important case, now before Justice Kennedy. It is the latest turn in a troubled reform debate. First there is the fight over disclosure, which is relatively new. For years this was supposed to be the common ground that camps badly divided over other forms of regulation could occupy: but no more. And just as reform communities have suspected political actors of cheating on the law, engaging in "circumvention,” now skeptics of regulation fear that, in the absence of consensus on legislative reform, state actors are resorting to extralegal administrative remedies.
Over the weekend, on the election law listserv, a snippy exchange quickly developed about the California case and what it represented. In some part, the views fired back and forth reflected the widespread assumption that positions on reform can be explained primarily by reference to their proponents’ political objectives. It is believed that reformers want regulation to advance progressive policies, or that their antagonists oppose regulation because they wish to surrender political power to the marketplace.