Levitt, Smith, and the Possibilities in Discussion

August 9, 2013
posted by Bob Bauer
Justin Levitt and Brad Smith are each top-flight thinkers about campaign finance who bring very different perspectives to issues in their field. Now a Professor at Loyola, Justin’s affiliations have included the Brennan Center for Justice. Brad, a Professor at Capital University Law School, founded and chairs his own Center, (the Center of Competitive Politics) and the two Centers are not at all alike in outlook or mission. Levitt and Smith have each recently written a piece—Levitt on the contribution/expenditure doctrine, Smith on the regulation of tax-exempt organizations—that, read side by side, track major, persistent disputes in political law. Each gets much right, but then overstates his case. For Levitt, his defense of regulation comes at the price of an understanding of the political costs. Smith is highly skeptical of regulation but in a way that gives short shrift to one complex regulatory goal that will not go away—public disclosure of certain kinds, and at certain levels, of spending to influence politics or policy.

“Dependence Corruption” Before the Supreme Court

July 29, 2013
posted by Bob Bauer
Among the briefs being filed with the Supreme Court in the pending test of aggregate contribution limits, McCutcheon v. FEC, Docket No. 12-536 (U.S. 2013), Professor Lawrence Lessig’s will draw its fair share of attention. Brief for Professor Lawrence Lessig as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, McCutcheon, Docket No. 12-536. In supporting these limits, he has introduced the Court to his “dependence corruption” theory of regulation. His choice to do so, in this case and in this way, may have been unwise, because whatever may be the theory’s utility or power in other contexts, it does not show especially well in this one.

The Super PACs in the Campaign Finance Reform Debate

July 24, 2013
posted by Bob Bauer
What to do about super PACs? Joel Gora, no admirer of campaign finance restrictions, argues that we should defend them. Joel Gora, Free Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They Co-Exist? Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 346 (2013). If they have come to typify the problems with money in politics, Gora contends, it is because we fail to appreciate their contribution to free speech, or their origins in long-standing independent expenditure jurisprudence. He adds: they didn't have the impact on the outcome that their critics widely feared. In other words, super PACs are good things, not bad things.

Progressive Reform and Progressive Politics

July 16, 2013
posted by Bob Bauer

Rick Hasen has thoughtful advice for progressives on campaign finance reform, and it can be summed up as an exhortation to live to fight another day. He counsels against misguided gestures (constitutional amendments), empty gestures (“lip service” to reform without action) and giving up altogether and moving on to other issues. Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, UC Irvine School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2013-117 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2293979 (Forthcoming in Harvard Law & Policy Review)

There is much Hasen has offered for reflection and discussion, but there are two issues—one of diagnosis and the other of prescription—that his analysis quickly raises.

Don McGahn has made his mark on the Federal Election Commission, and the recent Boston Globe account tells the story in familiar terms: he was dedicated to the evisceration of the campaign finance laws, he could count on the support of his Republican colleagues, and he did not go about this business with a soft touch. Commissioners now decline to reach across the aisle except to swat at one other, leaving two senior members to argue over the question of which of the them refused to answer the other's phone calls. The agency’s operations are defined by dysfunction, its atmosphere by disharmony. As the Globe dates these developments, the year 2008, when McGahn came to the FEC, is the turning point.

To accept that this is an unattractive portrait of the FEC—that this is not a model of constructive regulatory exertion even on difficult issues—is not to say that the picture is complete. The FEC has found the going rough for years, as the Globe noted: "stalled from the start," in the words of an early Common Cause critique. If what was once a stall has developed into flaming breakdown, the explanation must rest on more than the obduracy since 2008 of Don McGahn and his colleagues. The Globe makes a light pass on other factors but they remain in the background, diminished and incomplete.