It is no secret that the campaign finance debate has become fruitless and repetitious – – in short, exhausted. Mark Schmitt of the New America Foundation, a powerful progressive voice on reform, is one among a number of who believes that the entire question should be rethought from scratch. He has published a paper through a collaborative effort of the Brennan Center for Justice and the New America Foundation, arguing for a new framework built around a conception of political opportunity. He should win a large audience for what he says about the staleness and inaccuracies in the policy debate, and for the suggestions he makes for a change in direction.

Restrictions on the timing of campaign finance activity have met with mixed results in the courts. The injunction just issued in Houston blocks a ban on candidate fundraising in municipal elections to have taken effect except for the period beginning February of each election year through early the following year. Gordon v. City of Houston, No. 14-CV-3146 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2015). Other, but not all, cases have turned out badly for bans on contributions during legislative sessions. 

To Michael Malbin’s credit, he is taking seriously the political parties’ complaint about the terms under which they must compete for resources and influence with “outside” or independent groups. He accepts that a “rebalancing” is in order, and he proposes a compromise: more room for parties to coordinate their spending with candidates, in return for tighter enforcement of coordination rules against independent expenditure groups. He calls this a “third approach” to reform that which rejects both full de-regulation of party spending and any frontal challenge to the constitutional protections for independent spending.

When the Supreme Court took up the McCutcheon case, and again when it was decided, commentators suggested that the Court might be poised to reconsider the constitutional foundations of contribution regulation. The Justices had done what they needed to do to expand and solidify the right to independent spending; now they would turn their attention, in the same deregulatory spirit, to contribution limits, perhaps laying the foundation for invalidating them. McCutcheon does not by its terms really justify this fear. It did direct attention to the question of how—and not whether—contributions are regulated. And other cases percolating in the court system have begun to confront those questions.

If the uses of campaign finance rules to battle undue influence or its appearance will remain perpetually bogged down in disagreement – – particularly over whether the benefits of regulation justify the cost – – it does not follow that money in politics as a question for public policy has run its course. The question may have been overemphasized as one of corruption of the governmental process: corruption of the electoral process is also increasingly a concern, if less clearly and distinctly articulated. Critics of the condition of campaigns cite a range of problems with them, most recently and with rising alarm the candidates’ and parties’ loss of control to “outside groups” —Super PACs and (c) organizations—that operate under a different set of rules.

An astute piece by Mark Schmitt refocuses the argument on that point—the role of money in distorting the operation of the electoral process. He singles out for attention how a select community of donors influence the selection of candidates and the presentation of issues, raising questions of accountability and of the quality of voter engagement. This perspective has major implications for reform programs.