The decision in  McCutcheon  has not been the only source of lively rhetoric in the world of campaign finance. The FEC's commissioners took to very open squabbling, putting their cases in Statements of Reason and elaborating on them in op-eds and letters placed with the New York Times. The conflict in this instance involved Commissioner Ravel on one side and all of the Republican commissioners on the other, and they swiped at each other in strong terms over the properly defined responsibility of FEC Commissioners and the role of courts.

In an interesting Washington Post article, Professor Heather Gerken has proposed with co-authors a new strategy to advance  a core reform objective, the enhancement of transparency, as other options seemingly dwindle after CItizens United and McCutcheon. Heather is well known and well-respected for just such an insistence on thinking beyond the well-traveled, now largely exhausted policy choices. A good example is the Democracy Index, which she constructed to “harness politics to fix politics,” by generating political incentives for the improvement of performance on election administration through the publication of public rankings.

Richard Epstein has written about Citizens United before, and he returns to the subject again in his magisterial treatise on the classical liberal conception of the Constitution. His argument includes a challenge to widely held beliefs about corporate political power and motivation . The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2014) at 458; see also Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want,  34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 639, 655-660 (2011). He does not suggest that the regulation of government corruption is at all times unfounded or ill-advised, only that it is misdirected to the sphere of public political speech. The analysis he offers usefully raises again the question: is the debate about political reform overly invested in political campaign activity, while attention is paid intermittently and with little impact to other ways that well-financed interests move policy?  These are questions that have been productively raised by other scholars in the field, notably Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes.

How to establish priorities for the enforcement of the federal (or any) campaign finance laws is a difficult question. Congress has not specified them by statute and as the years go by, the Federal Election Commission has shown less rather than more agreement on what those priorities might be. As a result, sensible prioritization has sometimes gotten lost in partisan and policy conflicts. Adding to the problem is uncertainty about the enforceability of a law that is under pressure from changes in political practice and expanded constitutional limitations on regulatory action. Now the Commission is changing with the arrival of two new Commissioners, and a fresh opportunity is presented for discussion about the elements of a sensible, effective enforcement program. Ann Ravel, one of two new Commissioners, comes to the job with certain priorities in mind: disclosure and, more generally, “enforcement of significant matters.”

George Will has written about the problems that state campaign finance laws present for little people—“small groups and individuals” going about their business and discovering when they dip their toes into political waters that those waters can be treacherous. See Justice v. Hosemann, No. 3:11-CV-138-SA-SAA (N.D. Miss. filed Sept. 30, 2013); see also Galassini v. Town of Fountain Hills, No. CV-11-02097 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2013) at 1 (involving the “rights of an ordinary citizen [to] organize a protest”). The few hundred dollars these individuals and groups raise to express an opinion about a ballot initiative can subject them to a registration and reporting statute. They may find that they must put off their political project until they have complied with a law about which, only a short time before, they knew nothing. Some imagine, rightly or wrongly, that a lawyer has to be called, and eventually the call goes out—for a lawsuit. Will blames the errant course of the law on the insatiable appetite of “liberals” for “the regulatory state.”

But it is not certain that “liberals” or “progressives” who support reasonable campaign finance regulation would all applaud the results in these cases. They might well agree that there is a problem, one that arises from certain theories of enforcement and their application, not from core progressive commitments.