The IRS is now receiving comments on its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on (c)(4) activity, and certain of the views so far underscore the choice that the agency faces and does not make in its first set of proposed rules. It is the choice of line, and the “brightness” of that line, distinguishing “candidate-related” from social welfare activity.

Immediately upon the Treasury and IRS's publication of proposed rules on 501(c)(4) activity, the political jockeying began. Reformers said high time; critics replied that the suppression of free speech was at hand. The IRS Notice is not all that dramatic because what the Service may eventually do is up in the air: the IRS invites comments on all aspects of the definition of (c)(4) political activity. There is no way of knowing how this will all end up many months from now. But the IRS appears to be doing what both sides had demanded that it do for different reasons—improve on current rules—and its notice of proposed rulemaking simply calls for comment on a baseline proposal, which is fairly normal for this type of agency rulemaking setting. This is a reasonable place to begin.

How to establish priorities for the enforcement of the federal (or any) campaign finance laws is a difficult question. Congress has not specified them by statute and as the years go by, the Federal Election Commission has shown less rather than more agreement on what those priorities might be. As a result, sensible prioritization has sometimes gotten lost in partisan and policy conflicts. Adding to the problem is uncertainty about the enforceability of a law that is under pressure from changes in political practice and expanded constitutional limitations on regulatory action. Now the Commission is changing with the arrival of two new Commissioners, and a fresh opportunity is presented for discussion about the elements of a sensible, effective enforcement program. Ann Ravel, one of two new Commissioners, comes to the job with certain priorities in mind: disclosure and, more generally, “enforcement of significant matters.”

There is little left to be said about Judge Posner's second thoughts, and his further thoughts about those second thoughts, about his voter ID opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board. No one seems satisfied with his various statements—neither critics or supporters of the "ID" movement, and certainly not the lawyers whom he seemed to fault for failing to fully inform the Court about the consequences of ID statutes like Indiana's. But the frustration directed at him should be tempered, just a little, by this fact: in suggesting that much legal argument before and by the courts is ill-informed about the political process—and thus about the consequences of regulation or deregulation—the Judge has a fair point. And it is a point that applies to legal decision-makers of all kinds—legislators and regulators, as well as judges.

The recent emails from the Federal Election Commission, unearthed through a Freedom of Information Act request, don't reveal much that is new about the agency or the election law bar.  That Republican or Democratic lawyers might speak an encouraging word to the Commissioners on their side of the aisle does not qualify as breaking news. Here and there is a congratulatory note, or a substantive but not case-specific comment: but that's about it. Should anyone be surprised, it would be the long-time skeptic who has imagined that the parties are weighing in on pending decisions in the dead of night. There is none of that in these disclosures.