Beyond the various points of disagreement between Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent in McCutcheon, there is one striking, overall contrast to be drawn. Roberts makes a clear case against the aggregate contribution limits but, as Justice Thomas suggests, he may be less straightforward in revealing his doctrinal ambitions.  Breyer’s jurisprudential orientation is no mystery, but his defense of it, in the particulars, is a puzzle.

Under the federal campaign finance laws, the FEC and the IRS are directed to “consult and work together” in making their rules “mutually consistent.” 2 U.S.C. § 438(f). The IRS now proposes new 501(c)(4) tax exempt advocacy rules, responding to campaign finance controversies associated with the old ones, and the time has come for it to “consult and work together” with the FEC.  But the FEC Commissioners don’t themselves “work together” very well on these issues and so, splitting along party lines, they have presented two views to the Service. The difference in viewpoint is predictable—Democrats favor disclosure, Republicans are suspicious of it—but the real interest of these submissions lies more in the strategies behind these presentations than in their substance.

Here, then, are summaries of each set of comments, following by a “translation” into more straightforward terms of what rival camps are really trying to say and do.

Is Bill Maher proposing to cross the line from press commentary into campaign activity, or is he merely innovating, as the press is  scrambling everywhere to do, and preparing for a New Wave Editorial?  As Rick Pildes suggests, this question is mooted by Citizens United, which means that HBO and Maher can count on this decision to provide him much of the space he may need for his editorial project. Prior to Citizens United, HBO would have struggled to defend this program; in the wake of the decision, the path is generally clear, depending on how Maher produces the show.

How much can a candidate do for a Super PAC without illegally “coordinating” with it? Recent proposals would answer that she has to keep her distance—no publicly (or privately) stated support and no fundraising for the independent committee. A bit of a surprise has developed in the debate. While questioning how far these restrictions can go, Rick Hasen concludes that as a matter of constitutional law, Congress may prohibit the fundraising, and on this point, he sides in theory with Brad Smith of the Center for Competitive Politics. Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over Coordination, Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy (forthcoming), 16-17, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383452 ; Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 Willamette L. Rev. 603, 635 (2013). Rick Hasen and Brad Smith are not often found in the same jurisprudential company.  So it is interesting to consider how they may have arrived there and why, in their judgments about the regulation Buckley would allow, they appear to have erred.

The Justices yesterday pondered and puzzled over various hypotheticals about how large donations can flood into the political system. All advocates were highly able and performed well, but the discussion never came to a clear agreement about what the law would allow, or when its proper enforcement would require the Federal Election Commission to challenge underhanded activity. There was uncertainty about contribution limits and the various uses of the terms "transfers" and "contributions"; disagreement about how far the earmarking rules reached; distinctions blurred between "hard" and "soft" money; and differences over which schemes for evading the limits could be considered "realistic" predictions of political behavior. Justice Breyer offered one hypothetical and a view of the legal implications, then conceded he or his law clerk might have it wrong and would have to review the rules again.