Having worried about candidate fundraising for independent committees—officials were “vexed” about this prospect, the press reported—the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board appears poised to act on that worry. A new draft it will consider next week concludes that any candidate fundraising support for an independent committee is “coordination” and blocks the committee from proceeding with unlimited expenditures for the candidate.  Minn. Campaign Fin. & Pub. Disclosure Bd., Draft Advisory Op. 437 (Feb. 11, 2013).

How much can a candidate do for a Super PAC without illegally “coordinating” with it? Recent proposals would answer that she has to keep her distance—no publicly (or privately) stated support and no fundraising for the independent committee. A bit of a surprise has developed in the debate. While questioning how far these restrictions can go, Rick Hasen concludes that as a matter of constitutional law, Congress may prohibit the fundraising, and on this point, he sides in theory with Brad Smith of the Center for Competitive Politics. Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over Coordination, Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy (forthcoming), 16-17, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383452 ; Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 Willamette L. Rev. 603, 635 (2013). Rick Hasen and Brad Smith are not often found in the same jurisprudential company.  So it is interesting to consider how they may have arrived there and why, in their judgments about the regulation Buckley would allow, they appear to have erred.

Immediately upon the Treasury and IRS's publication of proposed rules on 501(c)(4) activity, the political jockeying began. Reformers said high time; critics replied that the suppression of free speech was at hand. The IRS Notice is not all that dramatic because what the Service may eventually do is up in the air: the IRS invites comments on all aspects of the definition of (c)(4) political activity. There is no way of knowing how this will all end up many months from now. But the IRS appears to be doing what both sides had demanded that it do for different reasons—improve on current rules—and its notice of proposed rulemaking simply calls for comment on a baseline proposal, which is fairly normal for this type of agency rulemaking setting. This is a reasonable place to begin.

Minnesota campaign finance officials are "vexed" by a request for an advisory opinion from an unnamed candidate. She (or he) would like to raise money for an independent expenditure committee that intends to support her—with independent expenditures. Minn. campaign board vexed by candidate's question regarding fundraising by outside groups, Star Tribune, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/230680961.html. Does this fundraising support make the committee any less independent and unable to spend unlimited sums on her behalf?

The Justices yesterday pondered and puzzled over various hypotheticals about how large donations can flood into the political system. All advocates were highly able and performed well, but the discussion never came to a clear agreement about what the law would allow, or when its proper enforcement would require the Federal Election Commission to challenge underhanded activity. There was uncertainty about contribution limits and the various uses of the terms "transfers" and "contributions"; disagreement about how far the earmarking rules reached; distinctions blurred between "hard" and "soft" money; and differences over which schemes for evading the limits could be considered "realistic" predictions of political behavior. Justice Breyer offered one hypothetical and a view of the legal implications, then conceded he or his law clerk might have it wrong and would have to review the rules again.