Rick Hasen recently published an interesting article on the legal remedies for malicious lying in politics. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 53 (Winter 2013) . He fears that “false and misleading speech may be increasing” in a “highly charged partisan atmosphere, in which each side cannot agree upon the basic facts,” and that the media, including the burgeoning fact-checking corps, “are not able to meaningfully curb candidates' lies and distortions.” Id. at 54. 55. Legal responses seem largely beyond reach, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), which Hasen reads to indicate that “broad laws targeting false speech stand little chance of being upheld, regardless of topic.” Id. at 69.

This piece was co-authored with Trevor Potter and published this morning in the Washington Post:

Four decades after the campaign finance reforms that followed Watergate, arguments over the role of money in politics seem increasingly tired and unproductive. We ought to build on the experience of recent years and consider what’s necessary for a new phase of political reform.

Reforms appear destined to fail unless they rest on three key points: They should focus not on further restricting funding for political activity but rather on broadening avenues of citizen participation; they should look beyond contributions to parties and candidates to take into account other ways that money influences politics, including through the intersection of lobbying and political funding; and they should be informed by the experiences of states and localities.

Richard Briffault is unfailingly astute in his observations about the campaign finance laws and lucid in expressing them. In the days not too long ago when worries gathered around “527”s, he wrote an insightful essay on that subject. Now, with Super PACs on the minds of campaign finance analysts, he has turned attention to them. His subject is the Super PAC dedicated to the election of a single candidate and run, often with the candidate’s public approval, by former staff and associates. He proposes that the “coordination” standard be re-defined to capture these cases of “disguised contributions” and bring them within limits. These are not independent committees, he argues, but candidate committees in all but the name.