The flooding of the IRS with criticisms of the proposed rulemaking has shown that, on this issue at least, Washington is experiencing unity across party and ideological lines. The basic complaint, of course, is that the draft rule is too broad, chilling or preventing or just burdening legitimate political speech or activity.  It is a remarkable proceeding.  Activities that have been the targets of soft money reform for years—issue advertising and various other voter education activities—are now being vigorously defended against government regulation. In  the short run, the result may be a rulemaking indefinitely delayed or, in content, much changed.

But, apart from the question of whether or how this draft might be revised to address these critiques, the hostile reception to the proposals may influence the course of the campaign finance debate in other ways.   Here are two:

A federal judge once opined that the federal campaign finance laws were hard to follow, and the same perplexity has been expressed by the Supreme Court—directly, in the course of oral argument, and somewhat less directly in an opinion of the court.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 334-35 (2010) (Kennedy, J.).  Conflicts over the constitutionality of various enactments and rules are common.  And much has been written about the  use and misuse of the heavily regulated legal process to harass, wear down or disgrace political adversaries.

Notwithstanding all of that, the beleaguered participant in the political process looking for legal advice can run into trouble when shopping for free or discounted legal services. Under federal and numerous state laws, these services are a contribution, like any other “in-kind” contribution, with some exceptions.  A fully  individual volunteer effort is typically permissible.  Or a firm can donate but not bill for the time of its lawyers,  provided the services are solely for the purpose of assuring compliance with the law  and the value of the services is disclosed.  As soon as life becomes more complicated, getting the help of a lawyer runs into contribution limits or restrictions on the sources of funds.

Back and forth go the arguments over alternatives to the current Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.   The scholarship it produces can be interesting, and the passions behind it lively, but the question always remains whether constitutional theory can result in manageable guidance to the Court.  This key question is one that Larry Lessig and others advancing an originalist anti-corruption theory of jurisprudence have had difficulty answering.  Without this answer, their work encourages hard-core opponents of any regulation to believe, or to claim, that  the alternative to Buckley—and to the current Court’s gloss on Buckley—is effectively limitless government authority to restrict spending on politics. 

How much can a candidate do for a Super PAC without illegally “coordinating” with it? Recent proposals would answer that she has to keep her distance—no publicly (or privately) stated support and no fundraising for the independent committee. A bit of a surprise has developed in the debate. While questioning how far these restrictions can go, Rick Hasen concludes that as a matter of constitutional law, Congress may prohibit the fundraising, and on this point, he sides in theory with Brad Smith of the Center for Competitive Politics. Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over Coordination, Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy (forthcoming), 16-17, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383452 ; Bradley A. Smith, Super PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 Willamette L. Rev. 603, 635 (2013). Rick Hasen and Brad Smith are not often found in the same jurisprudential company.  So it is interesting to consider how they may have arrived there and why, in their judgments about the regulation Buckley would allow, they appear to have erred.

The Center for Responsive Politics and the Sunlight Foundation have teamed up to preview the consequences if the Supreme Court in McCutcheon eliminates the biennial aggregate limit. Their work is the latest of a number of analyses predicting trouble without the limit.  It is also the most recent of its kind to exhibit the flaws in these predictions—and to suggest that the real concern with McCutcheon may lie elsewhere.