Campaign finance jurisprudence is intensely concerned with free speech rights, less and decreasingly with associational rights, and not at all with a more comprehensive conception of the requirements for conducting political action—“doing politics.” Why this is so is worth exploring. Something is missing here, and the gap is consequential.

So this is the question being debated about the Court opinion in the Arizona voting law pre-emption case: is it a major victory for the federal government, or just a win in this case, with the longer term effects to lie more on the side of the states’ authority to shape voting rights in federal elections? Forecasts range from sunny (The New York Times) to cloudy (Hasen) to stormy (Lederman).

The Democratic Disconnect: this is title of a report produced for the Transatlantic Academy by scholars who describe a critical breach in the relationship of citizen to government. Seyla Benhabib et al, The Democratic Disconnect (May 2013), http://www.gmfus.org/archives/the-democratic-disconnect-citizenship-and-accountability-in-the-transatlantic-community. They argue that around the world, the US included, "democracy is in trouble" as governments fail to answer to their citizens who respond with a deepening lack of trust and withdrawal from traditional channels of political engagement. Id. at 3. The urgent need is for "fairer and fuller citizen participation," a revival of civic engagement from the "bottom-up." Id. at 5, 118.

Professor Michael McConnell defends Citizens United, but it is a highly qualified defense. He is critical of the Court’s craftsmanship—the “overlong opinion” is the least of the problems, secondary in significance to a holding that ranged “beyond what the parties argued or the facts demanded,” and that has prolonged the jurisprudential agonies inflicted by the long-standing contribution/expenditure distinction. McConnell believes that the Court, relying on a rationale he views as “naïve” or “obtuse,” missed a better argument for the outcome. So much for the defense. He then proposes an alternative way of seeing—and more favorably evaluating—the decision to bless corporate independent spending.

Below is the text of a speech delivered this month to the American Constitution Chapter of Duke University Law School.

The Supreme Court has taken yet another case testing the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reforms, and informed observers anticipate another defeat for the 2002 law. But it could be more consequential than just one more loss in the war against soft money. The case, McCutcheon, is a case involving “hard money” contribution limits which, it has been assumed to this point, Congress possesses wide authority to impose and enforce.

This is the great divide established by Buckley v. Valeo, the one that separates “contributions” from “expenditures” on the theory that restrictions on contributions to candidates pose less of a threat to speech than those applied to expenditures that travel from the wallet of the spender directly to the airwaves or into the mailbox. One is taken to be a weaker form of expression than the other and entitled to less protection.

Such is the standing framework within which the constitutional issues affecting campaign finance are judged: one form of speech or the other, each weighed differently on the First Amendment scale. And trailing along behind them is the right to association, a distant third, and really an echo of the first two, as the associational interest here is typically treated as “expressive” in nature.

As someone who has long represented political actors—counseling on various forms of political action—I detect a problem here, which I would like to explore. It is the problem of refusing independent recognition, a weight all of its own, to political action—the business of building coalitions and acting in concert with allies to achieve political goals. The challenge is to distinguish political action from pure speech and locate a constitutional interest in what I will call here “doing politics.”