States enact different disclosure regimes, some better than others, and Professor Ray La Raja of the University of Massachusetts has posted the interesting question of whether and how more comprehensive, accessible disclosure influences the quantity and quality of newspaper coverage of campaign finance.  In an article appearing in the latest issue of the Election Law Journal, 6 Election L. J. 236 (2007), LaRaja reports his findings, having studied three years of state campaign finance coverage in the 50 states.  Better disclosure does not result in more , or more timely, reporting on campaign finance.  Somewhat against LaRaja’s expectation, scandal reporting does not rise with the quality of the disclosure regimes,  and “horse race” stories are less prevalent where mandated disclosure is robust.

   La Raja offers possible explanations for these results, particular in the evaluation of improved disclosure's effect on content.  He thinks it possible that disclosure regimes may encourage more careful compliance by politicians, reducing the quantity of scandal and leaving less of this to report. “With better disclosure, politicians recognize they operate in a highly transparent environment so they avoid contributions from groups and individuals which may attract unwanted public scrutiny.”  Id. at 248.

   The possibility suggested by La Raja will cheer disclosure enthusiasts.  The case for the enforcement power of disclosure is not fully convincing, however (and La Raja does not  suggest otherwise).  A state with a strong disclosure program may be one with a relatively “clean” political culture: the same culture yielding relatively strong compliance may be on in which we would find strong disclosure regimes.  There is a connection, then, between disclosure and compliance, but not one in which it could be said that the former “causes” the latter. 

  Also, advanced disclosure, to the extent that it is found in highly regulated systems, can reflect, as it does in the federal campaign finance system, intensive concern with corruption. And, as in  the federal system, the greater the concern with corruption, the more stubbornly it is believed that the corruption persists, that it is always assuming new forms and that it is highly resistant to reform efforts which must, for that reason, be constantly augmented.  What to make of the significance of disclosure in a particular state—and particularly what it makes of its relationship to the incidence of scandal—will depend on the history and culture of the particular state. 

   La Raja is asking important questions and raising others, one of the most important of which is: “Who are the primary consumers of disclosure data?”  Id.   La Raja calls for study of how outside groups use data, which influences, in turn, how the public understands money in politics, how campaign finance issues are framed and how the government is pressured to respond to those issues.  “In a certain sense”, La Raja writes, “what these [outside] groups highlight about money in politics defines the problems of the system and how to address them.”  Id. 

   This is absolutely true, and it is one of the reasons why there can likely never be what is called a “disclosure-only” regulatory regime.  To the “primary consumers” of the data, disclosure is never enough.

Bob Bauer