Matthew Mosk of the Washington Post ("Fundraisers Tap Those Who Can't Say No") and David Kirkpatrick of the New York Times ("Tougher Rules Change Game for Lobbyists") have each written a piece about activities, in fundraising and lobbying, that Congress has just finished reforming.  Mosk examines how bundling works, and he is interested in the networking, involving primarily social and professional pressure, that incline those "hit up" for money to surrender it.  Kirkpatrick surveys the worries now being expressed among lobbyists about their exposure to increased risk.  In each instance, their accounts underscore how the recent reforms, on many issues, don’t make new law but propose to take the rules already in place more seriously by providing for more disclosure and for higher penalties.

      On bundling:  much of the Mosk story considers the plight of the employee or business associate who, asked for money, has every reason, and not primarily political ones, to respond favorably.  Citing current rules—the corporate "facilitation" rules—Mosk suggests that they don’t say much, or regulate these activities in much detail.  And yet an argument could be made that they say enough:  the rules prohibit the corporate boss from directing subordinates to carry out fundraising projects for federal candidates, and they also make it illegal for the employer to use job-related pressure to compel the subordinate to make a contribution.  11 C.F.R. § 114.2(f)(2)(i)(A); 114.2(f)(iv) (prohibiting "coercion, such as the threat of a detrimental job action, the threat of any other financial reprisal, or the threat of force, to urge any individual to make a contribution or engage in fundraising activities on behalf of a candidate or political committee").

      The problem here is not the absence of rules, though the ones on the books could always be made clearer.  It is more the felt need to assure attention to the rules.  Here is where the Congress puts its money, so to speak:  on disclosure.  The bundling provision just passed would identify the bundlers; and by so doing, it presumably would add to the bundlers’ incentive to carefully review the points of vulnerability to which, following disclosure, they would be exposed.  Once the bundlers have been reported, along with the aggregate amount of the contributions they raised, the next question will be:  from whom did you raise it?  The bundler may not be willing to answer; the reporting committee—a candidate, party, or Leadership committee—may feel that it has no (political) choice.

      Kirkpatrick gives the additional example of money raised in proximity to or, even more dangerously, in conjunction with a pending legislative request or initiative.  With the disclosure of bundling, the timing of bundled contributions in relation to legislative activity may prove easier to trace.  As one of those interviewed for the article told Kirkpatrick, the new law enhances journalistic and prosecutorial ability to "connect the dots."  

     The offenses that may come into view once all the dots are connected are not freshly defined offenses.  They are, in fact, well-established under both Congressional rules and criminal laws.  The Congress’ package of reforms employ disclosure (and in some instances, somewhat tightened legal standards and higher penalties) to refresh the profile and "facilitate" the enforcement of the laws and rules as they pretty much already are.

Bob Bauer