To wish the political process to function as in their dreams is no dishonor to the dreamers.  There is trouble only in confusing the dreaming and waking states, and when the waking state is found short on the desired and dreamy qualities, proposing to legislate fantasy into reality. This is the sure road to laws that, establishing goals both unwise and impossible to achieve, betray, by a stunning complexity, the hopelessness and confusion of their mission.

     California reformers dream of driving politicians out of the redistricting process.  Such is their "negative" goal; their "positive" one is to fashion truly representative government, clean and finely tuned to the interests of "voters" who are in firm control of it.  The first order of business, more complicated than dreaming of this result, has been to devise a mechanism for transferring the responsibility for line-drawing from politicians to those with only the voters'—the public’s—interest at heart.

     This first order of business is a tall order.  The last round of California redistricting reforms proposed to put retired judges in command.  Judges, it was imagined, are sufficiently apolitical by trade, analytical by training, and scrupulously impartial in temperament that they could avoid partisan temptation or habits and do what was right.  Few were convinced.  Many were put off by the fact that, packaged as a proposal for neutral redistricting with His or Her Honors at the helm, there were partisan interests at work, with partisan goals in sight, in putting the proposal together. 

     Now a new proposal, Voters FIRST, is headed for the California ballot, and the mechanism for selecting a neutral line-drawing agency has changed. The objective is the same:  neutrality, protection from "politics."  Accepting that this is not easily achieved—it is a dream—the proposal puts forward a highly engineered process.  Any registered voter could apply; not all, however, are eligible.  Lobbyists are disqualified, as are former candidates, party officials or consultants, contributors of $2,000 or more to candidates, blood relations of state or federal officeholders, and this disability attaches to any such positions or actions occurring within 10 years of the date that the redistricting commission slots are to be filled.

     This is only the beginning.  The State Auditor removes the ineligible, then proceeds to choose a review panel of three certified independent auditors, two of whom have different major party affiliations and the third of whom has none at all.  The Panel members must select from the eligible pool 60 candidates for the Commission, chosen "on the basis of relevant analytical skills, ability to be impartial and appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and geography."  The 60 would be distributed among three "subpools," each one balanced between major parties and independence.

     Savor it:  three auditors, reviewing who-knows-how-many applications, will decide on the "relevant analytical skills," and will judge on this record who has the "ability to be impartial" supplemented by an "appreciation" of  California's "diverse demographics."  One can only hope that these essay reviews are superior, more searching and deliberative, than those conducted by the College Board.

     Once the 60 finalists have been selected, legislative leaders in both major parties will have "voir dire" privileges and can strike a determined number, spread among the subpools, until the list has been pruned to 36.  Then a random drawing would be used to pick eight Commissioners, and these eight would be empowered to choose the remaining six needed to make up the 14 member Commission:  all 14 would reflect the required distribution among partisan and nonpartisan affiliation.  When the eight chosen randomly pick the remaining six, however, there surfaces again the requirement that these six be chosen "on relevant analytical skills and ability to be impartial."

     So we have a system constructed out of a mish-mash of considerations and guidelines and limitations:  open access (any registered voter can apply); ineligibility criteria; balancing requirements; resort to random selection; an allowance for partisan complaint (the striking privileges granted to the legislative leadership); and a measure of delegated authority (to the auditors, and then to the first eight commissioners drawn randomly who are empowered to select the remaining six).  Very political really, in one sense, with a little bit of something for everyone.  The public is invited to take comfort that where criteria are applied positively to come up with the best candidates, special care will be exercised to assure that those who are "impartial" and "analytical" are favored.

     Is this better, more transparent and democratic, than the system by which elected officials draw the lines?  Critics of redistricting practiced by legislators brood about "back room deals."  Of course, in that case, we all know that there is back room dealing, and we know who, on what basis and with what measure of accountability, is doing the dealing.  Under Voters FIRST, it is not clear what to make of the procedure, except that it is very complicated and its complexity is justified, to those offering the justification, by the wish to navigate around different political interests and influences.  It is less transparent, really, and in operation, it might be expected to be as much arbitrary in its appointments and random in its effect as it would be "impartial" and "analytical."

     Its primary claim on the voters' attention is that it tries so hard not to be "political," advertising that intention.  Voters would be well advised to look behind the advertising and try to make sense, if possible, of the fine print. 

Bob Bauer